Contrary to some of the criticisms levelled against it, C-51 does contain a number of internal "checks and balances" which are intended to prevent abuse by government.
TABLE OF CONTENTS
FrontLine Safety & Security 2015: ISSUE 1
Sensor networks are not born of the Internet and are not intended to exist on the Internet. They possess unique security requirements compared to systems and service found on the Internet, and are a poor fit for legacy security designs.
We have not, and will not be able to eradicate terrorism, but we can manage and mitigate the sub-types of terrorism with active advancement to analyzed definitions and responsible terminology.
In today’s global cyber security market, Israel is considered a significant player in both R&D and in sales. This success is evident by the many R&D centers launched in Israel by global giants. The dozens of new startups being launched are attracting hundreds of millions of dollars in local and global venture capital investments; and Israel’s impressive export levels of cyber security services now stands at about 5% of the global market.
The mental trauma to responders from man-made disasters is very different from dealing with the outrage of responding to a terror event. the importance of having CIS training as an integral part of any frontline responder training program cannot be over-stressed.
The emergency service landscape has changed dramatically, becoming increasingly more intricate and demanding. Responders continue to embed technology into operations to help deal with the dynamic changing environment we serve, but is it enough?
Why is it that “no” is the typical response from a security-minded IT organization when asked to enable a new application on the network? This is so widespread that in many organizations the CSO is often referred to as the CS-NO.
As we begin our second decade, I offer an opportunity – to all who work in crisis management, business continuity, public safety, law enforcement, and similar organizations – to share your concerns and your knowledge with our readers.
A look at the Minsk Protocol (Minsk I) to stop fighting in Donbass, the implementation of the internationally-brokered Minsk II package (February 2015), and efforts of the Security Council.
A decade after the Mayerthorpe incident, many observers say the RCMP still haven't learned the lessons – even after the similar tragedy in Moncton in June of 2014. These two tragic incidents have become intertwined, both indicative of the inertia that exists when it comes to making changes within the RCMP.
The so-called “hard” landing of an Air Canada A320 Airbus at the Halifax Airport (YHZ) on March 28th, has called into question airport emergency response capabilities at the airport, and the larger issue of provision of navaids to strengthen international aviation safety.
The contentious RCMP purchase and allocation of modern assault weapons continues into 2015. In a 2011 memorandum to RCMP members, then Commissioner William Elliott wrote of “gaps in our operational firearms capabilities.” Yet four and a half years later, the carbines are difficult to find among RCMP patrolling officers qualified to operate them.
No doubt we can all agree that a “clear and present” online danger exists, but we are not ''at war'', so we can’t respond in kind. Caution demands that a thoughtful, transparent public debate must occur – and soon – to answer questions such as: What practical, legal, and ethical boundaries should govern the actions of cyber professionals globally?